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SUMMARIES 
Brouwer launched his intuitionist attack on the 
formalistic trends in mathematics in his now famous 
dissertation "On the Foundations of Mathematics" in 
1904. In the autumn of 1976, the author found what 
turned out to be the first version of Brouwer's dis- 
sertation. He also discovered that his supervisor 
disapproved and rejected what Brouwer considered to 
be the most important part of his dissertation. The 
extreme solipsistic views held by Brouwer in his 
later years are well known. The first version of 
the dissertation shows that these views were held 
before Brouwer began his intuitionist campaign and 
that they determined his philosophy of mathematics. 
The deleted parts not found in the final version of 
the dissertation are presented here in an English 
translation. In a brief introduction the author 
gives some of the historical background, based partly 
on the correspondence between Brouwer and his super- 
visor, Korteweg. 
Brouwer lanya son attaque intuitioniste contre 
les tendances formalistes en mathematiques dans sa 
these maintenant cglebre "Sur les fondements des math& 
matiques" en 1904. A l'automne de 1976, l'auteur 
dgcouvrit ce qui se trouve &tre la premiere version 
de la these de Brouwer et il d6couvrit en plus que son 
directeur avait d&approu& et rejete la partie que 
Brouwer regardait comme la plus importante. Que 
Brouwer fur ult&-ieurement un fervent adh&-ent du 
solipsisme est bien connu. La "premibre version" de 
la these montre que ces vues Btaient soutenues par 
Brouwer meme avant le debut de sa compagne intuition- 
iste et qu'elles d&erminbrent sa philosophie des 
mathgmatiques. Les parties que ont 6tB effacees et 
qu'on ne trouve pas dans la version dgfinitive sont 
ici pr&sentges en traduction anglaise. Dans une 
courte introduction, l'auteur donne quelques d&ails 
du contexte historique bas& en par-tie sur la corre- 
spondance entre Brouwer et son directeur, Korteweg. 
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Page one of the manuscript of Chapter Two in Brouwer's own hand- 
writing. The crossing out is by Professor D. J. Korteweg. 
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Almost 75 years ago Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer (1881-1966) 
launched his first "intuitionist" attack on the increasingly for- 
malistic trend in mathematics at the turn of the century. His 
early contributions to the debate concerning the nature of mathe- 
matics, the "crisis in the Foundations of Mathematics," remained 
largely unknown. Only years later, when he had established him- 
self as one of the world's leading topologists, was his protest 
taken seriously. His extreme challenge to the formalist and 
logicist claims, notably his rejection of the Principle of the 
Excluded Middle, and his rigorous constructive demands became 
the cornerstones of Brouwer's alternative school of mathematics, 
known as intuitionism. 
Most of his intuitionist themes can be traced back to 
Brouwer's dissertation, Over de Grondslagen der Wiskunde, 
published in February 1907, and recently made available in an 
English translation [Heyting 19751. There are traces, too, of 
a generally solipsistic philosophy and a rather pessimistic and 
misanthropic outlook on life. Brouwer had never made a secret 
of his extreme views on life, science, and his fellowmen. At 
the age of 17 he had already shocked his church congregation by 
declaring publicly in his personal "Profession of Faith" that, 
"as to the love of my neighbour . . . I can only say that I have 
never cared twopence about my fellowmen . . . the human images are 
the ugliest part of my representations." As a student he attacked~ 
the intellectualism of the Dutch arch-Hegelian Bolland in a series 
of articles in the student journal Propria Cures. He lectured 
publicly on his philosophical views in Delft (1904) and published 
these lectures in Leven, Kunst en Mystiek [Brouwer 19051. These 
publications leave no doubt about Brouwer's passionate involve- 
ment in a romantic revolt against intellectualism and industrial- 
ization. He fulminates against all things human, and singles 
out the human intellect as the cause of all evil. He condemns 
human progress and man's interference in the world, and as a 
latter-day romantic he advocates a return to nature and the 
simple life. There is a general agreement with Schopenhauer's 
pessimistic views, misanthropic attitude, appreciation of mysti- 
cism and Eastern philosophies, and his low regard for women. 
Until recently evidence for a direct link between these 
extreme personal views and Brouwer's intuitionist philosophy of 
mathematics could be found only in the proximity of the publication 
dates of Life, Art and Mysticism [1905] and The Foundations of 
Mathematics 119071, the fact that for some time Brouwer worked on 
the two publications simultaneously, and his passionate involvement 
in both causes (Van Stigt 19711. Most of The Foundations is 
polemical and critical; the passages which set out his alter- 
native philosophy are short and incomplete. For further clari- 
fication, and specially Brouwer's motivation, one had to rely 
on his nonmathematical Life, Art and Mysticism, whereas in his 
later contributions, in particular "Mathematik, Wissenschaft und 
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Sprache" (1929) and "Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics" 
(1948 C), Brouwer openly links the intuitionist philosophy of 
mathematics to his misanthropic and solipsistic views on life 
and man, it could still be maintained that at the start of his 
intuitionist campaign, Brouwer at least tried to establish a 
pure philosophy of mathematics, untinged by personal feelings 
and views. 
However, recent finds of the correspondence between Brouwer 
and his "promotor" [l], Professor D. J. Korteweg, and parts of the 
original version of Brouwer's dissertation have confirmed the 
very close link between Brouwer's solipsistic and mystical ten- 
dencies on the-one hand and his philosophy of mathematics and 
intuitionist mathematics on the other. Perhaps the most sur- 
prising discovery among the Brouwer Papers, which we were for- 
tunate to find in the autumn of 1976, was a manuscript that was 
clearly part of Brouwer's original version of the dissertation. 
Large pencil marks and comments in the margin in Korteweg's 
hand were clear evidence of the promotor's strong disapproval 
of the content. The Brouwer-Korteweg correspondence, some 146 
letters which we found during the winter of 1976/1977, unfolded 
the whole story of the dramatic events surrounding the writing 
of the dissertation, specifically Korteweg's rejection of the 
dissertation in its original form. Right from the start there 
was disagreement: Korteweg was disappointed when in 1904 his 
most brilliant student chose the foundations of mathematics as 
the subject of his dissertation. Fearing that "it might drive 
him too much in the direction of philosophy" [Korteweg to Brouwer, 
6.10.06, DJK 201, Korteweg agreed to the choice, "because Brouwer 
was so keen on this subject, that I felt I could not resist too 
much" [Korteweg to grant-authority, 19.10.06, DJK 191. 
For two years Brouwer studied in solitude and made careful 
notes. (These notes, in minuscule handwriting, have also been 
preserved--Brouwer Archief, BMS.3). In September 1906, he wrote 
to Korteweg: "I have now stopped reading other people's writings 
and am busy ordering my notes and arranging them into chapters" 
[Brouwer to Korteweg, 7.9.06, DJK.131. A month later he sent 
him a provisional division into chapters: 
"Chapter I The Construction of Mathematics; 
II The 'Genesis' of Mathematics Related to 
experience; 
III The Philosophical Significance of Mathematics; 
IV The Foundation of Mathematics on Axioms; 
V The Value of Mathematics for Society; 
VI The Value of Mathematics for the Individual." 
At the same time he sent Korteweg the completed Chapter I, "a 
general survey, for the purpose of reference in the following 
chapters; also to consider all kinds of recent research on the 
foundations of mathematics from one viewpoint i.e. their sig- 
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nificance for constructive mathematics" [Brouwer to Korteweg, 
16.10.06, DJK 151. 
After the more orthodox Chapter I, which served as a general 
introduction, Chapter II was to be the manifesto of Brouwer's 
strongly held views, the result of his reflections and his 
analysis of the nature of mathematics, its origin and relation 
to human experience and to the physical sciences. Continuing 
his search for the source of all evil, begun in Life, Art and 
Mysticism, Brouwer now found it in the human ability "to view 
the world mathematically." In a sombre, solemn mood, he analyses 
what happened at the primordial stage of human thinking and act- 
ing. Like Schop&hauer, Brouwer identifies causality as the 
source of human power and all evil. It is ironical that whereas 
Schopenhauer identified causality with the human will, which he 
had raised to such a prominent place, Brouwer interpreted 
causality as essentially mathematical: the human ability to 
link events in his mind, to see sequences and repetion of se- 
quences in time. 
The original version of the intuitionist Chapter II leaves 
no doubt that the identification of causality with "mathematical 
viewing" and Brouwer's moral disapproval led to a personal con- 
flict in the mathematician Brouwer, a conflict which he tried 
to resolve through his own conception of mathematics; that here 
the origin of Brouwer's intuitionist philosophy of mathematics 
in all its aspects is to be found. He sees the human ability 
to link sensations as the immediate source of our awareness of 
time and discreteness, and therefore as an essentially mathe- 
matical ability. This ability permitted man to create the 
natural numbers and, indeed, all of pure mathematics. Man, 
however, becomes immediately involved in the content of his 
sensations; he uses his mathematical ability to link events in 
time, to see sequences and repetition of sequences of events. 
This "mathematical ability" is the source of man's power to 
predict the future and interfere in the course of events. The 
intellectual, or "mathematical" way of looking at the world is 
not merely a "one-sided" concentration and interpretation of 
reality: by ignoring and wilfully removing aspects which deviate 
from the expected course of events, man supplements and creates 
more regularity than exists in nature, he makes the world linear 
or, as Brouwer prefers, "one-sided". 
Brouwer's moral disapproval of "applying mathematics" is 
still evident in the published version of his thesis in such 
expressions as "the cunning act" and in his critical analysis 
of applied mathematics and science. In the original version 
this disapproval is quite open and blatant: "damned are the 
qualities that promote man's rule . . . they are a lack of wisdom: 
the conquered and adapted environment will ultimately become 
intolerable to man," etc. Also clearer is his irritation with 
the claims of scientists: "the regularity they observe in the 
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phenomena is due to the nature of the measuring instruments . ..." 
"physical science has value only as a weapon, it does not con- 
cern life; indeed it is a disturbing and distracting factor like 
everything in any way connected with struggle . . . it is clearly 
inferior and has nothing to do with religion or wisdom." In 
the personal conflict between his conviction of the evil nature 
of " mathematical acting" and his own career as a mathematician, 
Brouwer moved to a conception of pure mathematics which would 
redeem it from the reprehensible aspects of "mathematical acting" 
and at the same time safeguard the a priority of pure mathematics 
with respect to science and logic. Pure mathematics is identi- 
fied with the constructive activity of the mind based upon time 
awareness alone. The most primitive concepts of discreteness 
and continuous originate in human awareness of time, coined by 
Brouwer as the "Primordial Intuition," the "Intuition of Time"; 
they are human creations and form the necessary and sufficient 
constructs for the whole "edifice of mathematics." 
Although there are frequent references to "intuition" and 
intuitive," the passages in both versions of the Foundations 
dealing with pure mathematics are short. Some guilt seems to 
remain attached to the "primordial intuition of mathematics" 
because of the monster it has fathered in the form of applied 
mathematics and science. 
A glimmer of hope and optimism is held out towards the end 
of Chapter II: "But mathematics practised for its own sake can 
achieve all the harmony . . . such as can be found in architecture 
and music. . .." 
When Korteweg received Chapters II and III, during the 
first days of November 1906, his worst fears were confirmed. 
Horrified, he struck out the greater part of Chapter II and 
called Brouwer in immediately on a Sunday afternoon. In no 
mistaken terms Korteweg told Brouwer that this pessimistic and 
mystical philosophy had nothing to do with mathematics and that 
some of his comments on applications were absurd. Brouwer's 
obvious contempt for mathematical application and his remarks, 
such as "the laws of astronomy are no more than the laws of 
our measuring instruments . ..II (11.10.20), were particularly 
painful to a man who had devoted his life to the ancillary as- 
pects of mathematics, and who had lectured on astronomy as part 
of the mathematics course. 
After the initial shock Brouwer mounted his defense. In 
three long letters, written within a week, he pleaded passionately 
with Korteweg. Korteweg's suggestion that he remove the "phil- 
osophical" first part and turn Chapter II into a survey of the 
phisical sciences and a criticism of Russell was countered by 
Brouwer's insistence that he was no expert in the physical 
sciences, and that his dlgressions on mechanics and physics 
served only as examples to support his leading thought: 
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By themselves, wrenched from the context some of these 
are even banal. . . . If the chapter were reduced to a 
survey of the physical sciences and a criticism of 
Russell it would lack its framework; I'd rather scrap 
the whole chapter [Brouwer to Korteweg, 7.11.06, DJK 
231. 
I would so much like you to understand and recognize 
this fundamental idea, the general rather than the de- 
tails, what can be read between the lines, even if 
your own philosophy is different and you consider mine 
as absurd,.because I am a product of my time and of a 
different generation [Brouwer to Korteweg, 5.11.06., 
DJK 203. 
Korteweg's initial reaction was a sharp reply which, how- 
ever, he did not send. (The original letter is marked "Not Sent" 
and was kept by Korteweg [DJK 211.) He was generous enough to 
overlook Brouwer's rudeness and take his difficult temperament 
into account. But Korteweg remained adamant, and in his charac- 
teristic mild manner he wrote on 11 November: 
Dear Brouwer, 
I have now also read your third chapter. The re- 
sult is very satisfactory. I think there is much in 
it which is excellent. I would like a few things ex- 
pressed with less bluntness: this could only cause 
bad feelings where they do not belong. Some statements 
could be put less dogmatically. Therefore only chapter 
two remains. 
After receiving your letter I have again considered 
whether I could accept Chapter II as it stands, but 
honestly Brouwer, I cannot. I find it all interwoven 
with a kind of pessimism and a mystical attitude to life 
which is not mathematics and has nothing to do with the 
foundations of mathematics. In your mind it may well 
have grown together with mathematics but that is wholly 
subjective. One could totally disagree with you on this 
point and still share your ideas about the foundations 
of mathematics. I am convinced that any promotor, young 
or old, whether he shares this philosophy of life or not, 
would object to it being included in a mathematical dis- 
sertation. In my opinion yours will only improve by re- 
moving it. It now adds a rather bizarre flavour which 
can only damage it. I have tried to indicate how it 
can be lifted out. Just consider it at your leisure, 
and see if you can see your way to making something of 
it that you too think worth keeping" [Ko@XWeg to 
Brouwer, 11.11.06, DJK 271. 
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Brouwer had to agree to the removal of the greater part of 
Chapter II and some parts of Chapter III, which to him formed 
the climax of his thesis: it would have been his public apologia, 
the justification of mathematical activity, and it contained the 
first account of his positive solution to the crisis in the founda, 
tions of mathematics, the primordial intuition of time. The 
original grand design of six chapters was abandoned. Brouwer had 
not changed his views on the relevance of a moral value judqement 
for the practice of mathematics, but it seemed pointless to sub- 
mit chapters on "The Value of Mathematics for Society" and "The 
Value of Mathematics for the Individual." Reluctantly he re- 
arranged the parts that Korteweg had approved. Some months 
later, when Korteweg made minor criticisms of some mathematical 
details of what was left of Chapter II, Brouwer resentfully 
blamed the general incoherence on the removal of his fundamental 
theme; the mathematical references were only intended as examples 
to serve the main theme as props: 
. . . in my own mind they were originally only incidental 
offshoots of a fundamental idea which held them to- 
gether, and which is not to be found in the disserta- 
tion any more, they only had secondary importance. 
After their sudden appearance in the full limelight, 
substituting for their former leader, it was not pos- 
sible to doll them up quickly in such a way that by 
themselves they could save the show. At least, that 
is my impression when I look at the chapter. [Brouwer 
to Korteweg, 11.1.07, DJK 321 
The final version of Brouwer's Foundations still contains 
much of his negative appreciation of applied mathematics and 
logic, and there still remains some evidence of his moral dis- 
approval. Some of the rejected parts, such as the account of 
the primordial intuition, have not been taken out. Although 
Brouwer complied with most of Korteweg's wishes, it is clear 
from his later writings that he had not changed his mind. He 
carefully kept the rejected pages of his thesis all his life, and 
later used some of the ideas and even phrases. The Rejected Parts 
are important for the clear statement they give of Brouwer's 
motivation for his fundamental theories, for the expressed posi- 
tive valuation of pure mathematics, and for providing a further 
context of what, in cryptic form, still exists in his Founda- 
tions. 
THE TEXT 
Brouwer kept only those parts of the manuscript of his dis- 
sertation that were rejected or amended by his promotor, D. J. 
Korteweg. There are in all 22 numbered written foolscap sides of 
paper, some in Brouwer's own handwriting, others most likely in 
HM6 Brouwer's Dissertation 393 
the handwriting of L. B. van der Spill [2], together with some 
sheets of various notes. They are: 
Chapter I pages 5, 6, 8, 10, 21, 35; 
Chapter II pages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 17, 20; 
Chapter III pages 22, 33, 34, 35. 
None of the pages of Chapter I were rejected: the preserved pages 
contain some of Korteweg's remarks or suggestions and are sub- 
stantially as published in the Foundations. The rejected parts of 
Chapter II are: all of pages 1 and 2; lines l-10 and lines 42, 43 
of page 3; all of pages 4 and 5; lines 1-19 of page 6; all of 
pages 10 and 11; lines l-21 of page 12. In Chapter III, the re- 
jected parts are: lines 13-48 of page 33; lines l-22 and 27-31 of 
page 34. 
We publish here all the passages rejected by D. J. Korteweg 
and, in some cases, parts which, although not rejected, form the 
immediate context. We have adhered to the Brouwer's own number- 
ing of pages and added numbers indicating the lines on the manu- 
script; e.g., II. 5.25 or simply 5.25 refers to Chapter II, page 
5, line 25. To distinguish between comments made by D. J. Kort- 
eweg and our editorial comments, we have placed D. J. Korteweg's 
remarks between single square brackets [ ] and editorial comment 
between double square brackets ,[I 13. The English translation 
from Brouwer's original Dutch is our own. We have indicated 
where the passages fit in the published version of the disserta- 
tion, using the pagination of the Dutch original (which is also 
given in the Collected Works [Heyting 19751. On each page of 
the translation of Brouwer's manuscript, a line separates the 
text from his footnotes; a dotted line indicates the end of 
a page. 
NOTES 
[l] The "promotor" at Dutch Universities has the general 
supervisory duties over a doctoral dissertation; he also carries 
the first responsibility for its academic standard. 
121 The fianci?e of Brouwer's brother Aldert (H. A. Brouwer, 
later professor of geology at Amsterdam University). She studied 
pharmacy at Amsterdam and lived at the time with the Brouwers. 
She frequently assisted Brouwer, doing final copy writing and 
drawing. 
CHARTER 2 
Mathematics and Experience 
1.1 All human life originated in a one-sided constric- 
tion of nature [*I and has protracted its existence in 
an "externalization," man impregnating nature 
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1.5 
1.10 
1.15 
1.20 
with the human self and repressing other one-sided de- 
velopments [l]. 
This externalization by man, making his environ- 
ment subservient to the full development of his humanity, 
appears to us [2] as a process whereby nature itself 
becomes linear and regular and all other life repressed or 
adapted to mankind [3]. 
What then is the nature of this human externaliza- 
tion which evidently is so much more powerful than the 
brute assimilation and destruction practised by other 
creatures? We find linearity and regularity, for example, 
also in bees; there it does not result in any sort of 
special power. But man has the faculty, accompanying 
all his interactions with nature, of objectifying the 
world, of seeing in the world causal systems in time [41. 
1.25 
1.30 
1.35 
[*I Eliterally, "making one-sided"--human concentra- 
tion on one single aspect of nature and adapting nature 
accordingly. 11 
[l] This externalization of life and the holding 
off of death, from the point of view of religion, reflects 
a lack of wisdom and the absence of a bond with the uni- 
verse. Moreover, this externalization, the will to 
destroy and rule, immediately obstructs any nourishing 
of the heart by nature. Those who rule are already damned, 
and damned are those qualities that promote man's rule. 
[2] If we view the world intellectually, i.e., with 
a mathematical causal eye. 
[3] Since the adaptation of the environment leads 
human life further and further away from the natural 
state which originally supported man, this conquered 
and adapted environment will ultimately become intoler- 
able to mankind. 
[4] This "seeing," however, is a human act of ex- 
ternalization: there is no real existence of objective 
natural phenomena as can be ascribed to nature itself: 
the seeing originates in man, is an expression of man's 
will alone, independent of nature which itself exists 
and independent of man's will. 
2.1 
2.5 
The primordial phenomenon is simply the intuition 
of time in which repetition of "thing in time and again 
thing" is possible, but in which (and this is a phenome- 
non outside mathematics) a sensation can fall apart in 
component qualities, so that a single moment can be lived 
through as a sequence of qualitatively different things. 
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One can, however, restrict oneself to the mere sensation 
of these sequences as such, independent of the emotional 
2.10 content, i.e., independent of the various degrees to 
which objects perceived in the world outside are to be 
feared or desired. (The attention is reduced to an 
intellectual observation.) The human tactics of "act- 
ing purposively" then consists in replacing the end by 
the means (a later occurrence in the intellectually 
2.15 observed sequence by an earlier occurrence) when the 
human instinct feels that chance favours the means. How- 
ever, since the link between end and means is observed 
in the intellect without the control of more central 
2.20 instincts (a restriction which will make the process 
even more intensive and more generally applicable), the 
reliability of the human conviction that the parts of 
the sequence belong together in reality is far from 
2.25 absolute and can constantly be disproved; this is ex- 
perienced by the intellect as a discovery "that the 
rule no longer applies." 
In general, however, these tactics, i.e., of ob- 
2.30 serving sequences and then jumping from the end to the 
means, prove effective and are the source of human 
power [l]. Indeed, if this faculty did not achieve its 
end it would not exist, as lion's paws would not exist 
if they failed of their purpose. It is possible to 
2.35 discover regularity in a limited domain of phenomena 
independently of other moments and other phenomena, 
which therefore can remain completely concealed from 
the intellectual observation. In this way one succeeds 
in getting on nature's weak side and in disarming enemies 
in an essential sphere of life. 
2.40 [l] There is a distinction between this form of 
replacing end by means, which is based on a purely 
active intellectual observation--not merely waiting for, 
but actively seeking such sequences--and aiming for 
something which is different from the end itself but is 
associated with this end and that therefore appears as 
a phase of the end itself; the latter is an animal as 
well as a human phenomenon 
3.1 To maintain the certainty of observed regularity 
as long as possible, one tries to isolate systems, i.e., 
to exclude observations which disturb this regularity. 
3.5 In this way man makes in nature far more regularity than 
had originally and spontaneously occurred in it. He 
wants this regularity because it strengthens him in his 
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3.10 
3.15 
3.20 
3.25 
3.30 
3.35 
3.40 
struggle for life as it enables him to predict the 
future and take his measures. 
The process of objectifying the world through the 
primordial intuition of "repetition in time" and "fol- 
lowing in time" gains in generality by the construction 
of mathematics from the same primordial intuition, with- 
out reference to direct applicability. In this way man 
has a ready-made supply of unreal causal sequences at 
his disposal, just waiting for an opportunity to be 
projected into reality. One should bear in mind that 
in mathematical systems with no time coordinate, all 
relations in practical applications clearly become 
causal relations in time; e.g., Euclidean geometry when 
applied to reality shows a causal connection between the 
results of different measurements made by means of the 
group of rigid bodies. Needless to say, in the applica- 
tion of a mathematical system, in general, only a frac- 
tion of the elements and substructures find their corre- 
spondence in reality; the remainder plays the role of 
an unreal "physical hypothesis." Similarly, even with 
a limited development of method, the observed sequences 
no longer consist exclusively of phenomena evoked by 
man himself (acts without any direct instinctive aim, 
but carried out solely to complete the causal system 
into a more manageable one). The simplest example is 
the sound-image [l] of number as a result of counting, 
or the sound-image [l] of number as a result of measur- 
ing 121. 
3.45 
4.1 
4.5 
4.10 
[l] or written symbol 
[2] This example shows how infinitely many causal 
quences can be brought together under the viewpoint 
of one single law of causality on the basis of a mapp- 
ing the numbers through mathematical induction. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The strategy of objectifying the world forces man 
even more to eliminate the "deviating" influences and 
thereby to abnormalize his environment. The nature 
of the phenomena within a certain domain changes not 
only through the elimination of the influences which 
deviate in this domain itself, but also through the 
degeneration of the environment of these phenomena be- 
cause of the removal of influences which deviate with 
respect to another quite different group of phenomena. 
In the case of a negative application of this 
science (i.e., by a process of destructive removal) this 
one-sided constriction often causes no further trouble, 
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but destruction remains destruction although the element 
to be destroyed was originally thought not to belong. 
However, if this science is positively applied (i.e., 
4.15 by adding or by forcing into the right form) the in- 
fluences which disturb the intellectual viewing can be 
of essential importance for the instinctive value of the 
results. In this way science, in a process of increas- 
4.20 ing self-perfection, will strengthen its power to ob- 
tain results but debase the value of these results. 
We observe in this context that "mathematical view- 
4.25 ing" is only instinctive, i.e., justified insofar as it 
is directed to a world which is considered to be ex- 
ternal; to try and direct it to inner perception is a 
serious error (moreover, there would never be any agree- 
ment between the results of mathematical viewing from 
different viewpoints). What Kant describes as "Trans- 
cendental Analytic" can only be described as idle play. 
-----------------__ 
The objectification of the world in mathematical systems 
by different individuals is held in mutual agreement by 
4.35 means of a passionless language which evokes in the 
listener a mathematical system identical to that of the 
speaker, although the emotional content of these systems 
may be completely different. The only purpose of the 
agreement between the mathematical systems of reality 
4.40 in different individuals is to enforce man's will over 
others out of fear or desire associated with certain 
elements in the system. [*I 
I*] [[Remarkby Professor Korteweg:]] [The emotional 
content is not the same for both; there is a corre- 
spondence--such "sameness" would even be quite useless; 
only the success desired by the speaker can connect ex- 
perience and language. But sameness of mathematical 
content in speaker and listener can certainly be achieved.] 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5.1 The creation of language is itself an example of a 
5.5 human uninstinctive act based on mathematical knowledge. 
Common mathematical systems are not desirable for their 
own sake (mathematical systems certainly lack a psych- 
ological basis for accordance), only as a means to an 
5.10 end. Again: the emotional representations evoked by 
the same word in different individuals may well be dif- 
ferent (or rather incomparable, since comparison pre- 
supposes mathematics). This, however, does not affect 
the general efficiency of language. Because of the 
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similarity of the relations in the mathematical systems, 
5.15 the speaker can still force the activity of the hearer 
with sufficient accuracy in the direction he desires, 
even if the representations associated with this activity 
5.20 are totally different in different individuals. 
Perhaps the greatest merit of mysticism is its use 
of language independent of mathematical systems of human 
collusion, independent also of the direct animal emotions 
5.25 of fear and desire. If it expresses itself in such a 
way that these two kinds of representations cannot be 
detected, then the contemplative thoughts--whose mathe- 
5.30 matical restriction appears as the only live element in 
the mathematical system-- may perhaps again come through 
without obscurity, since there is no mathematical system 
5.35 that can replace them [l]. When the mystical author 
joins representations of this kind into more central 
affections, of which they were one-sided restrictions, 
he can, with the most ordinary words, gradually break 
down the barriers round the contemplative sphere and 
guide us back to the "all-embracing" which every poet 
seeks to approach. His language will therefore appear 
5.40 as meaningless to those who expect to find in words 
only the 
[l] For example, in the case of the word time the 
awareness of solitary weakness, of roaming, deserted 
after rejection of guidance, may only break through 
when it is no longer possible to include the independent, 
variable coordinate of mechanics. 
6.1 communication of mathematical systems or a stimulus to 
mathematical activity. The mystical writer will even be 
careful to avoid anything that smacks of mathematics or 
6.5 logic: weak minds might otherwise be easily made to 
believe and act mathematically outside the domain where 
6.10 this is required either by the community or their own 
struggle for life and end up in all kinds of follies. 
------------------__ 
We should point out that we appear to be successful 
in observing sequences which, to our instinct, are 
broadly similar (or which through mathematical induct- 
6.15 tion can be brought under one single aspect with respect 
to approximate similarity); in particular, that "it 
works" if we draw up a sequence of w terms on which, for 
example, the measurement of time is based. 
lISuggestionsby K. J. Korteweg in the margin to 
replace the preceding by:1 
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[We notice, therefore, that we succeed in observ- 
ing an approximate similarity in the sequences given 
by our perception (or rather, which as to approximate 
similarity, can be brought under one single aspect); 
in particular, that "it works" if we draw up a sequence 
of w terms on which, for example, the measurement of 
time is based.] 
[ITheremainder of page 6 was not rejected by 
D. J. Korteweg and may be found in [Brouwer 1907, 
85-891 under the headings: The continuity of functions 
in physics and Differentiability of functions in physics. 
The manuscript, page 10, continues beyond the text of 
[Brouwer 1907, 8710. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
10.1 Is it surprising that not only do we succeed in 
observing sequences which repeat themselves again and 
again, but that so many groups of phenomena affecting 
our naive senses in totally different ways can be 
brought together under a few general aspects which are 
covered by simple constructible mathematical systems? 
10.10 This really would be a miracle, were it not for the 
simple fact that the physicist concerns himself with 
the projections of the phenomena on his measuring instru- 
10.15 ments, all constructed by a similar process from rather 
similar solid bodies. It is therefore not surprising 
that the phenomena are forced to record in this similar 
10.20 medium either similar "laws" or no laws. For example, 
the laws of astronomy are no more than the laws of our 
measuring instruments when used to follow the course 
of heavenly bodies. 
BThislast sentence is crossed out.I] 
Science, therefore, makes sense only when man in his 
10.25 struggle against nature and his fellow men, uses the cal- 
culations of counting and measuring; in other words, phy- 
sical science has value only as a weapon, it does not con- 
cern life- indeed it is a disturbing and distracting 
factor like everything in any way connected with struggle. 
10.30 But mathematics practised for its own sake can 
achieve all the harmony (i.e., an overwhelming multi- 
plicity of different visible, simple structures within 
one and the same all-embracing edifice) such as can be 
found in architecture and music, and also yield all the 
illicit pleasures which ensue from the free and full 
10.35 development of one's faculties without external force 
[“I. Poincarg (La Valeur de la Science, p. 264) is 
inclined to reduce all aesthetic affections to such an 
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10.40 affection of harmony. Perhaps his notion of aesthetic 
affection is simply an affection of harmony; but even 
according to him it is 
11.1 
11.5 
11.10 
11.15 
11.25 
[*I DComment, D. J. Korteweg:r] 
[Mathematical systems then would have "architectural" 
value and therefore a raison d'@tre only insofar as they 
are suitable as physical hypotheses in the struggle for 
life. Mathematical viewing of one's own thought, or 
one's own language, has no use in the struggle for life. 
Moreover, since systems that are applicable here are of 
such primitive simplicity there is no reasonable ground 
for the practice of this sort of mathematics.] 
1) We may therefore speak of an object only relative to 
other phenomena. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . ..-.. 
more: he says "outside science and aesthetic there is 
nothing but 'le pur r&ant."' He therefore seems to 
believe that it may be this aesthetic affection which 
is referred to as the highest good for mankind, pre- 
served with such great difficulty. This shows the 
blinding effect which the immoral, free and full develop- 
ment of human faculties has also on him. 
One further remark: we create the mathematical 
systems in the exterior world as a moment in our process 
of externalization, i.e., of holding out against the 
exterior world. Since "object" is nothing but a causal 
sequence, constant with respect to other variable causal 
sequences [l] (e.g., first of all, the rigid bodies whose 
group of transformations remains invariant in so many 
changes; but, for example, the energy of a system is 
equally objective as its material parts), we can say 
we create the objective world [2] in all freedom. In 
this way the adept, who do not wish to externalize 
th,emselves any longer, will find that a nothing remains 
since the objective will have vanished. Thus far Poincare 
is right when he defends science as "the thought com- 
municable to others," and says: "Tout ce qui n'est pas 
pens& est le pur n&ant" (La Valeur de la Science, p. 276). 
11.30 
11.35 
11.40 
[l] We may therefore speak of an object only rela- 
tive to other phenomena. 
[2] Attributing to this objective world an existence 
independent of man himself is nothing but a habit which 
has grown and lived in the mutual understanding of men; 
as "that which is common to all men" it is distinct 
from the individuals who are so strictly separated from 
one another. 
It is remarkable that many no longer consider the phe- 
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12.1 
12.5 
12.10 
12.15 
12.20 
12.25 
33.13 
33.20 First, the Kantian antinomies [2] a&due to an 
nomenal world to be objective, but still objectify their 
own representations of this phenomenal world, which is 
even more imprudent. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
What conclusion must be drawn from this as to Kant's 
Transcendental Aesthetic? As far as time is concerned 
it remains true that the possibility of our externaliza- 
tion on the basis of observation of causal sequences 
depends on it; also, that its properties are a priori 
certain, independently of the nature of the observations. 
We can go even further and say that the creation of time 
as a matrix of moments is a free act of man. With this 
creation, however, the conditions and all elements for 
the construction of the whole of mathematics are given 
at the same time. One of these constructions is 
Euclidean three-dimensional geometry, a suitable schema 
to govern a group of phenomena within one single language 
and an observation, a posteriori, like any other dis- 
covery of a useful physical hypothesis. 
-------------------- 
A few years ago a work was published on the foundations 
of mathematics, Russell's Essay on the Foundations of 
Geometry, considered by many as a work of great merit, 
by Couturat (Review de Mgtaphysique et de Morale 1898) 
as no less than the perfection of Kant's Transcendental 
Aesthetic, a KTllpCi El CXEI 
[[Theremainder of page 12 has not been crossed out 
and is found in [Brouwer 1907, 94 and 99 ff.] ]] 
CHAPTER 3 
DThe following passage was intended by Brouwer as 
the final passage of Chapter III and the whole of the 
dissertation. It follows immediately after the final 
sentence of the published edition [Brouwer 1907, 1771. 
It was rejected by D. J. Korteweg, who wrote:l] 
[I would leave it at that. It is better to give 
the following passage elsewhere if you so wish and 
do more justice to it. It would not make sense now 
that parts of chapter two have been dropped.] 
The origin of all kinds of trivial philosophies lies 
in the consideration of language as something essential, 
and not simply as a defective instrument that should 
be ignored as much as possible, to be used only as a 
last resort, even then it will always leave behind 
a depressing feeling of being just half satisfied. We 
shall go into this only briefly and touch upon a few 
points which throw some light on the matter above. 
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erroneous belief that words such as "world," "nature," 
"time," "freedom," must be understood as representing 
in themselves something objective; i.e., something 
mathematically existent, only because they occur in 
some instances of pure, i.e., mathematical reasoning; 
their mathematical function, however, in all such 
instances varies. Since they do not yet represent some- 
thing objective, the philosopher is completely free to 
build behind these words any mathematical system he 
pleases, so long as the ordinary usage of the word, on 
the basis of such mathematical hypotheses, does not 
33.30 become absurd. Obviously there are many such hypotheses. 
Then perhaps it is then not too bold to say that "the 
unity of contradictory parts," of which some philosophers 
love to speak, refers to the language of the complexity 
of superimposed structures, which every mathematical 
system is: it can directly and explicitly refer only 
to one such structure; but immediately through this it 
33.35 suggests all others. Therefore, to use their favourite 
expression, "there is no end" to what language expresses 
directly [3]. 
[2] In the physical sciences antinomies, of course, 
are acceptable: each of the contradictory systems can 
be of some service in the human struggle; still, one 
will try to rid oneself of the contradictions by a 
fusion of hypotheses. 
[3] Even so, to enforce this principle everywhere 
one tacitly makes jumps from mathematics of a lower order 
to mathematics of a higher order, e.g., in the case of 
the word "necessary." This word expresses a moment in 
the mechanical viewing of the world. If, however, the 
act is itself objectified again in a higher order mathe- 
33.45 matics (i.e. in idle play) we can, of course, no longer 
speak of it as "necessary." We could then say: the 
reality appears as "accidental." But then to proclaim 
as some kind of philosophical wisdom that, in reality, 
the contradictory parts are "verified" through each other 
"accidentally" and "necessarily" and "cancel out!" [*I. 
[*] [IThis sentence is incomplete in the original; 
the exclamation mark and the context imply Brouwer's 
disapproval.--Ed.]] 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
34.1 We will still be left with the disastrous confusion 
caused by a conscious use of language and by placing it 
in this way above the mathematics which it accompanies, 
while mathematics demands to be placed above life which 
it accompanies as a simple weapon, Howeveracting, the 
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34.5 
34.10 
34.14 
34.20 
34.25 
34.30 
34.35 
34.40 
mystical side of human life, can never be directed by 
knowledge, i.e., mathematics. 
The use of language is here again the source of 
much evil, since we run the risk of thinking of a non- 
mathematical idea, clothed in words, as dependent on 
its mathematical synonym, which suggests the killing 
of the idea by the parallel intellectual thought. 
In this way there exists a causality in life, which 
is the free externalization in the form of a decomposi- 
tion in time of some unity into two parts still remain- 
ing linked. There also exists a causality in science, 
which is nothing but a juxtaposition of systems along a 
variable continuous or discontinuous coordinate which 
we call time. The danger is that we lose the intuition 
of the former as the directing force in our lives through 
habitual and exclusive use of the latter, either by 
personal acquisition or by training! A contradiction 
developed in life where two externalizations of the 
instinct clash, and either proves the other to be un- 
tenable (the free morality will choose either to escape 
from the one which appears to be the weaker of the two 
instincts, or to melt the two through contemplation into 
a deeper harmony). There is another contradiction in 
science when it becomes clear that a given mathematical 
system cannot be fitted into another. The danger is 
that we lose the awareness of the first contradiction 
through our attempts to use the second as a guide in 
our lives. 
SUMMARY 
Mathematics is a free creation; it exists in de- 
veloping a primordial intuition which can be called 
"permanence in change" or "the discrete in the continuous. 
Applying it to the exterior world is creating the 
objective world; this is characteristic of the human 
strategy in the general struggle for life. As such it 
is clearly inferior and has nothing to do with religion 
or with wisdom. 
It is quite impossible that one day it will become 
empirically clear that one mathematical structure--be 
it Euclidean space or the theory of electrons--would 
be more true than another. 
Definitions may themselves never be viewed mathe- 
matically, they can only be a means accompanying our 
own memory of a structure or the communication of it 
to others. There are elements of construction which 
must remain elements also in definitions, and which in 
the process of communication must be expressed in a 
single sound: they are the constructional elements which 
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can be read from the intuition of the continuum; verbal 
signs such as "continous," "discrete," "unity," "again," 
"and so on" are not derivable. 
A logical construction of mathematics independent 
of intuition is impossible. In that way we can only 
35.1 construct a verbal edifice remaining absolutely distinct 
from real mathematics and which, indeed, like mathematics 
itself, needs the mathematical primordial intuition. 
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